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Summary 
 
On 26 December 2004, an earthquake off the Indonesian island of Sumatra triggered a 
massive tsunami that devastated costal areas of eleven countries around the Indian Ocean.  
More than 280 000 were killed and at least one million were displaced by the disaster.  An 
unprecedented emergency response ensued, with priority focused on the health and well-
being of survivors.  Citing the threat of outbreaks from waterborne diseases such as 
diarrhoea, cholera, typhoid and hepatitis, governments, UN agencies and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) urgently appealed for assistance to provide safe drinking water to 
affected populations.  This study was undertaken to document the drinking water response, 
including the role played by household water treatment. 
 
The destruction wrought by the tsunami on piped-in water supplies and groundwater pumps, 
and the saline water intrusion of shallow wells and surface sources, rendered much of the 
pre-tsunami supplies throughout the affected area completely unusable.  The combined 
efforts of governmental bodies, UN agencies, NGOs, defence forces, commercial companies, 
other organizations and committed individuals, however, mobilized a drinking water 
response that was timely, comprehensive and effective.  While specific actions varied 
somewhat from country to country, they followed a similar pattern that corresponded with 
the phase of the emergency.  Following the first 48 hours, when survivors relied mainly on 
unaffected sources and some bottled water, responders began to reach areas in which the 
affected populations were assembling.  They distributed large tanks and mobilized tanker 
trucks to fill them.  As emergency efforts turned to stabilization and resettlement, responders 
used mobile treatment plants and emergency storage and distribution systems to increase the 
quantity of water supplied.  Distribution systems were repaired or rebuilt.  Restoration of 
many groundwater sources, however, continues to be challenged by saline water intrusion. 
 
Despite evidence in development settings and certain emergencies that household water 
treatment, including chlorination, filtration, solar disinfection and combined 
flocculation/disinfection, are effective in improving the microbiological quality of drinking 
water and thus preventing the risk of waterborne disease, household-based approaches did 
not play a significant role in the initial phases of the tsunami response with the possible 
exception of boiling.  This was not due to their lack of availability; millions of units of these 
products where shipped to the region.  Rather, responders often found that household water 
treatment was not suitable during the immediate aftermath of the disaster due to (i) the need 
to emphasize water quantity over water quality, (ii) the unique conditions imposed by the 
tsunami that continued to necessitate the supply of bulk treated water, (iii) the unavailability 
of human and other resources for the programmatic support to launch household water 
treatment, (iv) concerns that the introduction of new methods of water treatment would send 
mixed messages about other practices, and (v) concerns about the sustainability of such 
methods.  Boiling did play a role, though there was evidence to suggest that as it was 
practiced in tsunami affected populations, boiling was not providing adequate protection 
against faecal contaminants.  Some organizations expressed the view that household water 
treatment would be introduced during the resettlement phase of the disaster response.  
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Much of the drinking water response to the Indian Ocean tsunami focused on providing a 
sufficient quantity of water, with perhaps less focus on quality.   While this is consistent with 
recently developed norms, such a compromise may not have been necessary in this situation, 
where water was largely supplied in bulk and could have been adequately chlorinated at the 
source, in the truck or other supply line, or in the tanks at the camps.  Surveillance of water 
quality was occasionally hampered by confusion over responsibility as well as a lack of 
equipment and trained personnel.    There is evidence in certain areas that water quality, both 
at the source and especially at the household level, was compromised by high levels of faecal 
pathogens.   
 
A comprehensive system of disease surveillance was undertaken in the affected areas in most 
countries.  This yielded little evidence of epidemic levels of any infectious disease, including 
diseases that are frequently waterborne.  This lack of outbreaks, however, is actually 
consistent with the experience following most natural disasters.  The evidence clearly shows 
that the inevitability of an outbreak following a natural disaster is a myth.  An exaggerated 
risk of waterborne diseases could divert attention from other priorities.  At the same time, it 
is possible that the lack of outbreaks is attributable in part to the massive response that 
frequently accompanies a natural disaster.  In any case, it is important not to become 
complacent, particularly since living in crowed camps is known to increase risk and the 
normal season of waterborne diseases increases with the onset of the monsoons. 
 
We conclude with several recommendations:  (i) continue to take steps to minimize the risks 
of waterborne diseases following natural disasters, (ii) develop and disseminate practical 
solutions for the special circumstances associated with tsunamis, including saline water 
intrusion, (iii) clarify the conditions under which proven approaches to household water 
treatment may be useful in emergencies and assess their role in the medium- and long-term 
response, (iv) improve water quality and surveillance without compromising emphasis on 
water quantity, (v) take advantage of the enormous resources committed to the tsunami 
response to make effective and sustainable improvements in water, sanitation and hygiene in 
the affected areas, and (vi) document experiences from the tsunami response, distil the 
lessons learned, disseminate the results and develop guidelines to inform future actions. 
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BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION  
 
On 26 December 2004, an earthquake off the Indonesian island of Sumatra measuring 9.0 on 
the Richter scale triggered a number of massive tsunamis.  The leading wave raced through 
the deep water at a speed of more than 800 km per hour.  As it neared land, its enormous 
energy unleashed at least three waves of up to 25 m, killing and devastating coastal regions 
of eleven countries around the Indian Ocean.  At least five million people were affected in 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Malaysia, the Maldives, the Seychelles, Myanmar and 
Somalia. The death toll exceeded 280 000 people, and more than one million persons were 
displaced as a result of the destruction. 
  
Citing the threat of outbreaks from waterborne diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera, typhoid 
and hepatitis, governments, UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
urgently appealed for assistance to provide safe drinking water to affected populations.  A 
World Health Organization (WHO) release two days after the event was typical:  “Poor 
quality and quantity of water and insufficient sanitation, overcrowding and poor hygiene in 
temporary camps will bring forward the risk for outbreaks of different diarrhoeal diseases. 
Thorough and sustained water purification is an absolute priority.” (WHO, 2005)    Rapid 
assessments and statements stressed the urgency of the drinking water response:  “Access to 
potable water is essential to avoid the propagation of waterborne disease. “ (IFRC, 29 
December 2004).  Calls for the provision of safe water—a need with which all humans can 
readily identify—became a central theme in the campaigns of many organizations as they 
themselves became inundated with unprecedented levels of contributions from around the 
world.  Many organizations even accepted in-kind donations of filters, chlorine and other 
water treatment products.   Regular situation reports from the field monitored the drinking 
water response throughout the affected region. 
 
While its magnitude, forcefulness and breadth, along with its seawater medium, present 
particular challenges in the provision of drinking water, in most respects the profile of a 
tsunami resembles that of a flood caused by a hurricane or cyclone.  The drinking water 
response corresponds roughly with the phases of the emergency described by Davis and 
Lambert (2002).  During the immediate emergency phase, people flee to high ground or other 
protected locations.  Survivors are dependent on local resources for food and water while 
outside help begins to mobilize.  A stabilization phase ranging from a few days to a few 
weeks then ensues when survivors begin to gather into makeshift camps.  During this period, 
governmental authorities and relief agencies begin to provide a survival ration of water, 
gradually increasing to address personal hygiene and other needs.  Once the immediate 
emergency is over, the recovery phase begins with the construction of more durable shelters 
and support systems, including emergency water treatment and distribution.  Camp- and 
community-scale systems such as those developed by Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF) and many other NGOs come on line.  Finally, a prolonged resettlement phase then 
begins during which destroyed and contaminated water systems, wells and boreholes are 
restored, rebuilt or replaced.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
Household water treatment and storage may play a role at each of these stages.   In an 
emergency context, when normal supplies of drinking water are interrupted or compromised, 
affected populations have long been encouraged to boil or chlorinate their drinking water in 
order to ensure its microbiological integrity (CDC, 1993).  More recently, the treatment of 
water at the household level has been shown to be more effective in preventing even endemic 
diarrhoea than traditional methods of improving or protecting the microbial quality of water 
at the source or to the point of distribution (Clasen, 2005; Fewtrell, 2005).   
 
With the assistance of the WHO, and funding from Hindustan Lever Ltd., we undertook this 
study to investigate and document the drinking water response in the immediate aftermath of 
the tsunami, including the role of household-based water treatment and safe storage.  This 
paper presents and discusses the main results of that investigation.  It also makes 
recommendations for the future based on our findings.           
 
 
METHODS 
 
Shortly after the tsunami, we began monitoring broadcast, web and print media to obtain 
information relevant to the drinking water response and to identify organizations that were 
involved therein.  Commencing four weeks after the event, we started contacting the 
identified organizations, including governmental ministries and authorities, UN agencies, 
NGOs and private-sector companies.  We explained that we were working with the WHO to 
investigate and document the drinking water response, including the role of household-based 
water treatment interventions.  We encouraged them to provide any relevant information, 
including copies of any reports or accounts that addressed drinking water issues, and to 
supply us with the names and contact details of their representatives in the field.  We 
contacted these representatives by phone and email and asked them to provide any further 
relevant information and reports.   
 
Commencing approximately eight weeks following the event, we began two-week field 
assessments in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.  These countries were selected because they 
collectively represent a significant majority of the human casualties (known dead or missing) 
and perhaps a similar portion of internally displaced persons (IDP) living in camps or 
temporary shelters.  We interviewed national, regional and local representatives of 
organizations involved in addressing drinking water issues, obtained copies of reports, and 
accompanied them on visits to affected areas.  During our field work, we interviewed on-site 
relief personnel working on water, sanitation and hygiene projects, including local personnel 
involved in providing water.  We also met with health workers, mainly in temporary clinics.  
Finally, we interviewed victims of the disaster and solicited their input on the drinking water 
response from the immediate aftermath through the first four months.  A list the 
organizations that provided information for this study appears in Annex 1.  
  
Although we took steps to collect as much relevant information as possible, circumstances 
limited our investigation.  First, while we intentionally delayed our investigation so as to 
minimize interference with the response itself, the continued priorities of attending to the 
emergency at times limited our access to key personnel.  Second, logistical issues and costs 
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permitted us to conduct field assessments in only selected countries and locations.  Third, in 
soliciting information for this study, we agreed to respect the confidentiality of our sources, 
where necessary, in order to encourage candid disclosure, respect privacy and protect 
proprietary information.  While we acknowledge that these factors may bias our results, they 
are the limitations that typically attend emergencies of this kind and thus may be necessary to 
some extent in order to obtain potentially useful lessons.    
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
1.  Pre-Existing Water Supplies and Impact of Tsunami. 
  
With the notable exception of Aceh, the areas most affected by the tsunami consisted of a 
relatively narrow strip of land (a few metres to up to 5 km) along the sea coast.  Depending 
on the location, this area varied in population density from isolated rural areas where no one 
resided to medium-sized cities.  As a result, the water supplies serving the affected area came 
from a wide range of sources, including surface water (ponds, rivers and streams), hand-dug 
wells, springs, boreholes, piped-in water systems and tanker-supplied water.  Shallow wells 
(usually <10 metres deep), unprotected wells, some fitted with hand pumps, represented the 
most common source of drinking water, though these frequently produce water with a high 
level of saline and faecal contamination  and often produce no water whatsoever during the 
long dry seasons between monsoons that extend to most of the region.  Rainwater harvesting 
is practiced in some areas, but does not play a major role due to limited and seasonal rainfall.  
Although portions of the affected population had household connections to conventional 
treatment and distribution systems, most drew water from household or communal sources 
that were untreated and unprotected.  Regardless of the source, many stored water in the 
home due to inadequate and unpredictable supplies.  
 
The tsunami affected existing water supplies in at least five ways.  In those areas hit hardest 
by the impact of breaking waves, many of the supply and distribution systems, regardless of 
their type, were completely destroyed or otherwise rendered inoperable.   In other areas, 
where the impact was less forceful, rising waters inundated surface sources and unprotected 
wells with seawater, sand, debris and, in many cases, faecal matter from coastal areas where 
open defecation was common and sanitation facilities were largely unimproved. Third, even 
protected sources such as shallow wells, many of which had high levels of salinity before the 
tsunami, underwent subsurface saline water intrusion, raising the saline level to a point that 
rendered them unfit for human consumption.  Fourth, wells and other sources of supply that 
did survive the tsunami itself were often used at rates beyond safe recharge.  In some cases, 
excess use may have increased saline water intrusion, resulting in water that was no longer 
potable.   Finally, in some regions, there were dramatic shifts in the coast line, thus 
completely eliminating former home sites and complete communities.   As a result of all of 
these factors, many sources of drinking water in the affected areas were unavailable or 
unusable following the tsunami.  Groundwater experts have also expressed concerns that the 
inundation introduced chemical and microbiological contaminants as well as increased 
salinity into the aquifers that may affect water quality for years to come (IGRAC, 2005).   
 
2.  The Drinking Water Response  
 
The evidence to date from those countries from which information is available suggests that 
the drinking water response to the tsunami disaster was timely, effective and comprehensive.  
Though the area has never experienced a disaster on the scale of the 26 December 2004  
tsunami, the countries involved are regularly affected by heavy monsoons and flooding, 
perhaps explaining why governmental bodies were quick to mobilize.  UN agencies and 
NGOs, some of which already worked in the region with populations affected by conflict, 
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provided invaluable experience and expertise, and were able to assume complete 
responsibility for specific areas.  Defence forces played an important role in the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster, and continued to help reach remote areas.  Commercial companies, 
organizations and individual volunteers all made important contributions.  Their collective 
efforts with respect to the drinking water can perhaps best be summarized with reference to 
the phases of the emergency response. 
 
2.1 Immediate Emergency Phase.  
During the immediate emergency, when those who survived the impact of the tsunami began 
assembling onto high ground or other unaffected areas, reliance was chiefly on local water 
supplies that had not been damaged by the force of the waves or by the rising seawater.  
Mosques, temples, churches, schools, hospitals and public buildings and grounds offered the 
first refuge for reuniting families and creating some minimum space for collecting a few 
possessions.  In those areas in which the damage was more sporadic, survivors gathered at 
the homes of family, friends and neighbours.  In the 24-48 hours immediately following the 
disaster, the affected population relied largely on serviceable groundwater sources in these 
locations. The quantity of water supplied during this period was extremely limited; many 
survivors had no vessels in which to store water, and these basic sources were quickly 
exhausted by the rapidly increasing demand.           
 
2.2 Stabilization Phase. 
As the magnitude of the disaster was being realized, governments (including defence forces), 
UN agencies, NGOs, private-sector companies and committed individuals began to mobilize 
the relief effort.  Rapid needs assessments were undertaken and disease surveillance and 
control teams were dispatched.  A decision was taken not to institute mass immunization 
campaigns for vaccine-preventable waterborne diseases such as cholera and typhoid, relying 
instead on environmental interventions and comprehensive disease surveillance.  The water 
response during this period consisted of various initiatives:   
 
• Packaged water (in 200ml polybags and PET bottles) was distributed to some squatter 
camps, though some organizations expressed concern about the microbial quality of 
this water.  These were also being distributed to thousands of individual volunteers 
who were conducting search and rescue operations as well as recovery of bodies, road 
clearing and utility restoration efforts. One clearly visible downside to this response 
was the high levels of solid waste which persisted around camps due to packaging 
materials. However, other accounts report that the bottles were often re-used as water 
collection and storage vessels.   
 
• As roads became serviceable, large plastic 500L to 2500L tanks were set up at the 
squatter camp sites.  These tanks are commonly used by householders for storing 
larger volumes of water to make up for intermittent supplies from conventional 
sources.  As a result, they were quite readily available in many affected areas.  The 
tanks were typically filled by public and privately operated tanker trucks which are 
also common in many of the areas. While NGOs frequently hired and paid for the 
tanker deliveries, water supply was typically provided by the governmental water 
boards.  Because of the focal nature of the damage caused by the tsunami, the tankers 
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were normally able to procure water from unaffected sources within relatively close 
proximity to the affected areas.  While the tankered water was normally believed to 
be chlorinated at or before the loading point or on the truck, as discussed more fully 
below, there are questions about such treatment.  
 
• In a limited number of areas, mobile water treatment purification plants (including 
desalination plants) and portable coagulation/disinfection systems were brought in 
and began producing large volumes of potable water.  In most cases, these were used 
to fill tanker trucks, though in other cases, they were positioned near camps and 
supplied them directly, storing water in bulk in corrugated steel “Oxfam” tanks and 
collapsible bladder and onion tanks, and distributing the water using rigid and layflat 
(fire) hose to communal tap stands. 
 
• In a few areas, relief organizations began to encourage the affected population to treat 
their own water, mainly by boiling.  In other areas, bleach (sodium hypochlorite), 
bleaching powder (calcium hypochlorite), chlorine tablets (NaDCC,  halazone), PUR 
sachets (combined flocculant and disinfectant), and alum (flocculant) were distributed 
with the intent that they be used for treating water at the distribution points or at the 
household level.  These household-based approaches are discussed below.  During 
this period, relief organizations also began distributing vessels and utensils for 
collecting, storing and consuming water.  Nutritional drinks, milk and other available 
liquids were also distributed as safe though limited means of hydrating survivors.  
 
In most cases, governmental authorities, including state and local water boards took the lead 
in supplying water.  They were also typically responsible for ensuring the microbiological 
quality of the water they supplied, chiefly by using some form of chlorine alone.  In some 
cases, health authorities monitored water quality, usually only by checking levels of residual 
chlorine.  In those areas where governments could not respond, defence forces and 
international relief agencies took responsibility for water supplies.  Water and sanitation 
coordination committees, consisting of key actors in this sector, began to form and allocate 
responsibility, usually by region or camp; these meetings also provided a forum to raise and 
discuss challenges that were unique to the particular emergency, such as saline water 
intrusion. 
  
2.3 Recovery Phase. 
As more relief supplies were being delivered to the affected areas, especially tents and 
supplies for establishing more durable shelters, some survivors were moved to semi-
permanent ‘temporary living centres’ with water supply systems and sanitation facilities.  
Others remained in transitional camps, while relief agencies continued to implement 
improved water supplies and latrines, cooking facilities, etc.  In many cases, however, 
survivors were already returning to the sites of their former homes, setting up tents or living 
in makeshift shelters so that they could protect their holdings and begin to rebuild.  Some 
maintained a nominal residence in camps or settlements (thus potentially misleading the 
official statistics) so as not to jeopardize their eligibility for assistance.   
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• For the most part, populations continued to rely during this period on tankered water 
delivered to the large plastic storage tanks, some of which were moved with the 
population to the temporary settlements.  In fact, these two simple and low-
technology pieces of equipment probably played the most important role among all 
hardware involved in the drinking water response. Nevertheless, there were problems 
with their use.  First, despite being deployed in great numbers, the combination of 
tanks and tankers was often insufficient to meet the demand for water quantity.  
Water boards often controlled deliveries, making it difficult at times for NGOs to 
service camps for which they were responsible.  Tanks were often empty, a problem 
that could be aggravated as summer approached and the need for water increases.  
When the trucks did arrive to fill the tanks, usually no more than once or twice per 
day, householders rushed out with anything that could hold water and filled them 
directly from the truck to maximize their water supply, concomitantly increasing the 
risk of contaminating their stored drinking water prior to use in the home.   A lack of 
coordination, understandable under the circumstances, also meant some locations had 
more water than they could use.  Second, there was often confusion about who was 
responsible for ensuring that the water was appropriately chlorinated.  This lead to a 
lack of treatment in some cases, and excess levels of chlorine (up to 6 ppm, or 15 
times the residual level required) in others. Neither the truck drivers nor, in many 
cases, anyone in the camps had the tools or know-how to chlorinate or check residual 
chlorine levels in supplied water.  While they were usually filled from deep 
boreholes, treated municipal systems or NGO water plants, reports also emerged of 
tanker operators refilling from irrigation points or surface sources to reach their daily 
target volumes more quickly. Third, while fitted with taps, the tanks had loose fitting, 
non-secured covers over large diameter openings.  As a result, some users found it 
more expedient to fill their household containers by directly dipping them into the 
tanks, creating a serious recontamination hazard. Finally, in certain locations, the 
delivered water had a distinct colour and odour (suggesting the possibility of 
chemical contaminants) and a floating layer of particulate on the surface in the tank, 
providing further evidence of refilling from untreated surface sources as well as 
suggesting insufficient cleaning of tankers.  
 
• In certain areas, such as Tamil Nadu in southeast India, the state water board, 
municipalities and Gram panchayats restored piped water supplies to many of the 
affected areas, and established hundreds of new public water points to make up for 
the loss of wells due mainly to saline water intrusion.     
 
• In some areas, relief organizations were operating desalination plants (reverse 
osmosis and electro-dialysis).  There was concern, however, about the ability to 
continue using such plants due to their high operating costs (in India, for example, the 
estimated cost was Rs 0.60 (US$ 0.014) per litre.  Some water treatment plants used 
in the initial phase had already been shut down and were no longer in use.  During 
this period, many of the defence forces, who had brought their own mobile water 
treatment plants, packed up and moved out, usually taking all their equipment with 
them.   In those instances in which they were operating donated equipment, they 
coordinated with relief agencies to assume responsibility after their departure. 
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• By this phase, household water storage vessels were usually in adequate supply.  Still, 
most of these were procured locally and were not fitted with taps or narrow mouths to 
minimize recontamination.  Broken taps were common.  In some instances, the 
hygiene programs that responders began to introduce during this period included 
instructions on safe water handling and storage.  
 
• Wells that were able to provide drinking water with acceptable levels of salinity were 
identified as sources of drinking water.  In some cases, relief agencies chlorinated and 
cleaned wells and marked them as safe for drinking.  Other wells were used for 
purposes other than drinking and cooking, though salinity levels were often so high 
that people did not even use them for personal or household hygiene.  In certain areas, 
people were digging new wells.  Here the main concern was locating them too close 
to latrines or other sources of contamination. There was also a focus on digging both 
new and existing wells sufficiently deep to accommodate the drop in water table 
levels that occur during the dry season. 
 
• An additional concern was that when the monsoon season begins, people may begin 
to use surface water and other untreated sources, thus increasing the risk of 
waterborne disease.  
 
2.4 Resettlement Phase. 
After three months, most new initiatives focused on the resettlement of the affected 
populations.  In some instances, survivors were relocating in new settlements, either because 
of fear of another tsunami or because of government mandates designed to reduce 
vulnerability.  In such cases, water is  supplied centrally, usually via municipal treatment and 
distribution systems, or settlers rely on household or communal groundwater or surface 
sources.  In most instances, however, displaced populations are returning and rebuilding on 
their previous home sites. Both scenarios present certain implications:  
 
• Government-drafted recovery plans contemplate the expenditure of significant 
amounts of tsunami aid to upgrading water and sanitation facilities, particularly in the 
most populous areas.  The unprecedented amount of money raised and committed 
creates an opportunity to implement suitable, appropriate and sustainable solutions 
that reflect best practices based on experience in environmental engineering and 
public health.  It also creates the risk that funds will be allocated based on political, 
commercial and other priorities. 
 
• Restoring wells has presented a particular challenge.  While this normally consists of 
removing silt and debris and chlorinating the well to deal with microbiological 
contamination, saline water intrusion has rendered many, perhaps even most, wells 
unusable even after several months.  Pumping the wells to encourage freshwater 
recharge has proved ineffective in many cases.  While many of those interviewed 
expressed optimism that groundwater sources would recharge with freshwater after 
the commencement of the monsoon, hydrologists have explained that many of the 
groundwater aquifers servicing such wells have themselves become contaminated, 
thus raising questions about the near-term restoration of the wells and the futility of 
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digging wells or drilling boreholes that tap the same aquifer.   
 
• In addition to assisting with redevelopment and restoration, relief organizations are 
involved with other initiatives relating to drinking water.  As described below, 
household-based water treatment, and water handling and management practices 
generally, are being introduced as part of integrated water-sanitation-hygiene 
programs.  Water quality testing and surveillance can also be implemented on a more 
systematic basis.   
 
3.  Household Water Treatment 
 
While efforts must continue to expand access to safe piped water supplies, treating water at 
the household level is increasingly recognized as an effective and cost-effective intervention 
against waterborne disease.  In development settings among low-income populations, NGOs 
have implemented household-based approaches to water treatment, including boiling and 
pasteurization, chemical disinfection (e.g. the Safe Water System-SWS), solar disinfection 
(e.g. Sodis), filtration (e.g. ceramic candle filters, biosand filters), combined 
flocculation/disinfection (e.g. PUR and Watermaker) and improved household water storage 
vessels.  Some of these approaches have also been shown to be effective in preventing 
waterborne disease in emergencies, including floods and other natural disasters and political 
conflicts (Roberts, 2001; Doocy, 2005).   
  
In the Indian Ocean tsunami response, boiling was the most common approach to treating 
water at the household level.  This was particularly true in Aceh where UNICEF and the 
Ministry of Health have promoted boiling for years. Issues arose concerning the introduction 
of chlorination as an alternative to boiling, particularly when investigators for NGOs found 
evidence of unsafe water at the household level.  In one study, 47.5% of water sampled from 
400 households (78% of which reported boiling, the others not treating their water at all) 
were positive for E. coli, and a significant majority found it often (25.7%) or sometimes 
(42.6%) difficult to practice boiling, mainly due to the unavailability (65.5%) or cost (62.8%) 
of fuel or lack of a stove (20.8%) (Handzel, 2005).  Nevertheless, due to the scale of demand 
on those involved in the emergency response, most NGOs promoted boiling as the only 
practical means of treating water at the household level during the initial phases of the 
emergency.  They observed that because boiling was well-known and widely accepted, it did 
not require programmatic support for its promotion, thus allowing them to focus on providing 
basic water and sanitation needs.  They also reported that they believed boiling was the 
obvious alternative for those householders who were consuming water from unsafe wells or 
surface sources because they did not like the taste of chlorinated water being delivered to the 
camps.  
 
Some relief organizations promoted chlorinating water at the household level, but only to a 
limited extent.  They noted that householders showed greater willingness to chlorinate their 
water during the initial phases of the disaster, mainly using liquid bleach (sodium 
hypochlorite), bleaching powder (calcium hypochlorite) or a variety of chlorine tablets that 
were widely distributed during the first two weeks of the response.  Health officials 
explained that when faced early on with dead bodies and other obvious sources of perceived 
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contagion, survivors seemed more willing to treat their water and accept the uncustomary 
taste of chlorine.  As the recovery effort continued, however, many discontinued this 
practice, perhaps because their assessment of vulnerability declined, but also because other 
bulk supplies of water were more readily available.  How extensive or important such 
household chlorination actually was is difficult to assess.  What is clear, however, is that in 
the absence of programmatic support, chlorination in the home was not generally accepted, 
particularly when the risk of waterborne disease was not readily apparent and alternatives 
became available. 
 
The limited role of household water treatment was not a result of unavailability of the 
technology.  In fact, the quantity of products sent to the region for the purpose of treating 
water was remarkable, particularly in view of the quantities that can be shown to have 
actually been used by the affected population.  
 
• Chlorine and the Safe Water System (SWS).  Common sources of chlorine from 
liquid bleach, bleaching powder, household disinfectants were widely available in 
most areas, but this was used mainly for cleaning and disinfecting rather than for 
treating water.  An estimated 140,000 bottles of sodium hypochlorite specifically 
designed for water treatment were shipped to Aceh province from an already 
established SWS programme in Jakarta for use by an NGO experienced in promoting 
the SWS. (The SWS combines disinfection with locally produced sodium 
hypochlorite, safe storage, and community education.) 70,000 bottles were actually 
reported to have been distributed to affected communities by the end of March.  
Bottles were initially left with camp coordinators for distribution; however it was 
soon found that this was not resulting in proper use and distribution was suspended 
until training could also be provided.  A training session of 30-60 minutes 
significantly increased uptake and the portion of households with sufficient residual 
chlorine levels.    
 
• Chlorine Tablets.  It is believed that millions of locally-produced chlorine tablets 
(mainly chloramine/hydroclonazone, halazone and calcium hypochlorite/HTS) were 
shipped to affected areas.    While these were widely available in the early phases of 
the emergency, we found few of these tablets in the camps after several months, and 
it was difficult to find shops that stocked them or knew that they could be used for 
treating water.  One foreign manufacture reported shipping a total of 30 million 
dichloroisocyanurate (NaDCC) tablets to the region in a succession of orders, mainly 
from NGOs and UN agencies.  While chlorine tablets were used to treat water in bulk 
and in certain settings immediately following the tsunami, only limited use of these 
tablets at the household level could be confirmed.   
 
• Combined Flocculation/Disinfection.  Sachets containing a combination of a 
flocculant plus a time-released disinfectant have been shown effective in preventing 
diarrhoea in refugee camps and other emergencies (Doocy, 2004).  Within two weeks 
of the disaster, over 15 million sachets of combined flocculant/disinfectant were 
shipped to Sri Lanka and Indonesia; a month later, another 1 million sachets went to 
the Maldives.  After four months, however, much of the product had not yet been 
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used.  In Aceh, two NGOs suspended distribution after giving out roughly 1.6 million 
sachets due to questions about its suitability and acceptability, as well as lack of 
human resources to provide necessary programmatic support.  Certain NGOs 
expressed enthusiasm for the product, noting its potential, especially when turbid 
surface water (e.g. from the river) is the only available option. In the majority of 
locations around Aceh, however, water was largely sourced from wells or tanker 
supplies and was of acceptable clarity. In such cases, recipients reported that the 
treatment process was too complex and the resultant taste was unpleasant. In Sri 
Lanka, except for some initial use in limited numbers, NGOs were waiting to use the 
product at later stages, especially after monsoons commence, when the risk of 
contaminated (and turbid) water would be greater and the product could be deployed 
with necessary training and follow-up. 
 
• Ceramic Filters:  India and other countries throughout south Asia are among the 
largest producers and users of ceramic drip water filters.  Several brands could be 
purchased in shops near the areas affected by the tsunami at prices from Rs700-1100 
(US$16-25), and local WHO officials reported that some householders were 
purchasing and using them.  Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that filters were used 
only sporadically in the four months following the disaster.  In one camp in Tamil 
Nadu, RedR India reported that 40% of the population had been given such filters and 
that the positive results should lead to wider use in villages and urban camps. 
UNICEF distributed 550 donated filters to families in five locations in Aceh, and 
though follow-up confirmed the filters were well received and in use, they had no 
plans to expand the program preferring instead to focus on hygiene messages and 
promotion of boiling.  Oxfam, which has previously used the filters in post-flooding 
responses and other settings, procured 20,000 filters within two weeks of the tsunami, 
but decided to deploy them only in the resettlement phase when people began to re-
establish their households more permanently.   
 
• Solar Disinfection.  Local NGOs (Helvatas and LEAD) introduced the Sodis solar 
disinfection program in 5 camps in Sri Lanka and 22 villages in Tamil Nadu, India.  
While local partners are also implementing the Sodis program in other parts of 
Indonesia, NGOs elected not to implement the intervention in the tsunami-affected 
areas there due to the availability of treated water under camp- or community-wide 
systems. 
 
• Biosand Filters.  Two NGOs (Dhan Foundation and Samaritan’s Purse) with 
experience in biosand filter programs reported plans to introduce the filters during the 
resettlement phase of the emergency response.  In the earlier phases of the 
emergency, however, biosand filters did not play a major role.          
 
• Improved Storage.  A few NGOs imported and distributed improved water storage 
devices (with small necks to prevent introduction of hands and taps for safely 
accessing water).  In general, however, householders used locally-produced open-
mouth vessels, buckets, pots and tubs to collect and store water and use it in their 
tents, shelters or homes.  Local inhabitants who were not directly affected by the 
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disaster often procured and provided such vessels to survivors, together with food and 
other utensils.  While improved storage vessels may have been readily embraced by 
the affected population, they simply were not available in large numbers in the 
immediate aftermath of the disaster, and once conventional water containers were 
provided, relief organizations did not regard them as a priority. 
 
The main reasons for not using household water treatment fall into five main categories: 
 
• Emphasis on Water Quantity over Quality.  As recommended by Sphere and other 
guidelines, the initial emphasis in the drinking water response was on quantity rather 
than quality.  Physiological needs (hydration) are the first priority, and outweigh 
microbiological concerns.  As discussed more fully below, this will have important 
implications in the priority attached to household water treatment.  
 
• Unnecessary Given Bulk Supply of Water.  Because the population affected by the 
tsunami was either displaced or had otherwise lost access to their customary sources 
of fresh water, they were dependent on water supplied in bulk.  In fact, it is possible 
that the saline water intrusion that rendered so many surface and shallow groundwater 
sources unusable actually helped minimize waterborne disease since affected 
populations were not even tempted to consume water from such sources that were 
also likely to be contaminated by microbial pathogens.  
 
• Need for Programmatic Support.  All of the common means for treating water and 
maintaining its microbiological quality at the household level require some level of 
programmatic support.  While some approaches, such as certain gravity filters that are 
easy to use and make noticeable improvements in water aesthetics, may require less 
of a behaviour change campaign than chlorination or solar disinfection, all household-
based approaches require a commitment of both human and financial resources for 
their introduction that may be impractical in the early phases of a disaster.  Moreover, 
while emergencies are often viewed as an opportunity to expose and introduce an 
affected population to new health and other initiatives, this in not typically true until 
the situation has become stabilized and recovery begins.  As noted above with respect 
to parts of Aceh, the introduction of chlorination as an alternative to boiling was 
resisted.  Among other things, this was due to its awareness, given its own long-
standing campaign to promote boiling, of the significant effort required to obtain high 
levels of adoption of such interventions even without having to deal with a massive 
disaster.  
 
• Concern about Mixed Messages.  In Aceh where the practice of boiling drinking 
water is widely reported and genuinely appears to be a well-established behaviour, 
there was concern (particularly from the Ministry of Health and UNICEF) that new 
messages about alternative water treatment methods may confuse matters and result 
in a decrease in normal practice, thus leaving individuals exposed to increased risk of 
waterborne diseases. With so many agencies working on water, sanitation and 
hygiene promotion issues, the early stand made by UNICEF and the Government of 
Indonesia on the water boiling issue was an attempt to avoid proliferation of 
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conflicting messages being given to the affected populations which only serves to 
dilute their effectiveness. 
 
 
• Concerns about Sustainability.  In addition to the previously discussed preference for 
existing practice, concerns about the sustainability of new household-based water 
treatment methods also led to resistance to their introduction. For example, the 
Indonesian Government made it clear that they would not commit to the chlorination 
of all public water supplies once the relief agencies left and so it was important to 
maintain the high pre-tsunami levels of boiling. Although the circumstances and 
raised risk perceptions which result from a natural disaster may be sufficient to 
trigger initial or short-term behaviour change, as has been discussed, these do not 
seem to be sustained and people may no longer feel the need to treat their water if 
there aren’t any visual or sensory cues to suggest that it is unsafe or unpalatable. Such 
short-term behaviour change without sustained promotion could be detrimental to 
health if it means the abandonment of previous safe drinking water practices. It will 
also be essential to maintain a supply of the hardware (e.g. sodium hypochlorite or 
flocculent/disinfectant sachets) which may become difficult in the unstable regions of 
Sri Lanka and Aceh.        
 
Except for the concerns about sustainability, these reasons mainly argue against the 
premature introduction of household water treatment, rather than against its use altogether.  
In fact, many of the relief organizations who had procured products with a view toward 
introducing household water treatment reported that they still planned to do so but were 
waiting for more appropriate circumstances.  Some organizations expressed the view that 
point-of-use water treatment at the household level was an ideal solution for certain members 
of the affected populations once they began to return to their home sites and no longer had 
access to bulk supplies of treated water.  Others also reported that they planned to take 
advantage of the presence of large numbers of people in the camps and temporary settlements 
to introduce household water treatment as part of an overall water/sanitation/hygiene 
program and ensure its proper use before people vacated these settings.   
 
For these reasons, conclusions about the role that household-based water treatment and safe 
storage in the tsunami response may be premature.  Such interventions have demonstrated 
their effectiveness in development settings, and it is possible that they will be an important 
part of the overall drinking water response in the medium- and long-term.  We have therefore 
recommended that this specific issue be revisited 12 to 18 months following the tsunami to 
better assess the role of household-based water treatment. 
 
4.  Water Quantity and Quality. 
 
The common dichotomy between water quantity and water quality was evident in the 
drinking water response.  In part, this was due to the similarly common separation of 
responsibility:  supplying minimum amounts of water was often the responsibility of one 
branch of government (e.g., Public Works, Water Board, etc.) while ensuring the quality of 
the water fell to another branch (e.g., Ministry of Health, Health Board, etc.).  More likely, 
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however, this reflects the actual differences in the demands of the affected population, the 
natural response of the first responders, and basic fact that providing water does not require 
unusual training or technology. 
 
Initially, most responders emphasized water quantity, access and availability.  For the most 
part, the evidence suggests that these efforts were successful.  As can be expected in the early 
phases of a disaster response, there were camps and other settings with inadequate water.  
This was perhaps particularly true in those locations in which the wells or other sources were 
completely inoperable or in communities that traditionally had been water stressed.  Those 
populations that could still obtain water from shallow wells, even though too saline to drink, 
were able to meet certain water needs from these sources.  The almost immediate availability 
of tanks and tanker trucks was a key factor in satisfying water demand.  Moreover, the 
government response in restoring, and in many cases, installing piped water and distribution 
points, also contributed significantly to the provision of adequate supplies of water.   
 
Efforts to ensure the quality of the delivered water, on the other hand, were less successful.  
While some international NGOs brought and used portable water testing kits that assessed 
water for faecal contamination, most governmental and other agencies involved in the 
provision of drinking water were not regularly testing the microbial quality of the water 
whatsoever.  In some instances, there was no clear allocation of responsibility for 
chlorinating the water.  In most cases, however, it seems that authorities were too 
overwhelmed with the supply of water to focus much attention on its quality.  While the 
WHO and others provided chloroscopes and pool testers to measure the residual levels of 
free chlorine in supplied water, those with access to these devices often did not know how or 
when to use them. Excess levels of chlorine in supplied water encouraged some people to 
revert to more risky alternative sources due to the unacceptable taste and smell.  For the 
reasons discussed below, the fact that no serious outbreaks of waterborne diseases were 
reported from the affected areas should not lead to an inference that the drinking water 
quality was consistently sufficient.   
 
It is possible that organizations emphasized water quantity over water quality.  In fact, this is 
recommended under Sphere standards and other guidelines (Sphere, 2004; Davis & Lambert, 
2002).  In the present case, however, it is not clear that surveillance of water quality needed 
to be compromised to concentrate on water quantity.  Governments often allocated this 
responsibility to different branches, and NGOs experienced in water and sanitation are 
organized to do both.  If water quantity and water quality is a zero-sum game in an 
emergency such as this, however, the need to emphasize quantity may have important 
implications for household water treatment.  First, the evidence supports the perhaps obvious 
point that in the absence of sufficient quantities of water, interventions to improve water 
quality are not effective (Clasen, 2005).  Second, most approaches to household water 
treatment require some, and for certain technologies, considerable, programmatic support.  
This simply may not be practical in the initial phases of a disaster response when other higher 
priorities out-compete in the demand for time and resources.         
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5.  Surveillance 
 
5.1 Disease Surveillance 
Disease surveillance was an important priority immediately following the disaster.  In most 
regions, this was led by national ministries of health, with assistance from the WHO South-
East Asia Region and certain relief agencies.  Most countries had a reasonably well-
established disease surveillance system in place which formed the basis for special measures 
in response to the tsunami.  Medical and public health teams were dispatched to the camps to 
undertake disease surveillance. As the response developed, outbreak early warning systems 
were implemented in certain areas, and laboratories were organized and equipped to diagnose 
epidemic-prone diseases.  In India, teams recruited from the hundreds of Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare personnel throughout the country were assembled and each assigned to 
cover six or seven camps (Chatterjee, 2005).  In Sri Lanka, disease surveillance was 
primarily handled by medical personnel working in camps and settlements.  In Indonesia, on 
top of high losses of health staff and facilities the task was made more difficult due to lack of 
sufficient pre-tsunami capacity; no system for centralised data collection at the district or 
provincial level was previously in place meaning that there was only limited health statistics 
available.  
 
While these efforts appeared to be adequate, there are some uncertainties about the adequacy 
of the disease surveillance and the lack of reported outbreaks.  In Thailand, where one of the 
most well-developed public health infrastructures is in place, officials from the Ministry of 
Public Health reported significantly higher cases of acute diarrhoeal disease following 
December 26 in the six provinces affected by the disaster (CDC, 2005).  By mid January, the 
annualized rate was 1.7 times that of the previous year.  No similar increase in respiratory or 
febrile illness or wound infection was observed.  A survey of 400 households in IDP 
settlements in Aceh found 25.3% (54 of 214) children under 5 years of age reported having 
diarrhoea during the two weeks prior to the interview, with 2.4% reporting an episode of 
bloody diarrhoea during this period (Handzel, 2005).  In some instances, we observed that 
health workers from outside the area could not say with certainty what number of cases 
represented normal endemic levels of common diseases such as diarrhoea. 
 
Three months after the disaster, however, status reports and end-of-mission summaries from 
emergency responders in the region agree that no serious outbreaks of infectious disease ever 
materialized.  While cases of malaria, measles, watery diarrhoea and hepatitis were reported, 
the WHO and others concluded that there was no evidence that these were above normal 
background levels in countries in which these diseases are endemic. In respect of waterborne 
diseases such as cholera, shigellosis and dysentery, no serious outbreaks were reported 
(WHO, 2005a).  In its 90-day report, the WHO observed that “millions of Tsunami (sic.) 
survivors throughout South Asia and East Africa have escaped the horrors of major 
epidemics of communicable diseases in the immediate aftermath of the disaster”, and 
credited this to “the resilience of the public health systems and response capabilities of the 
affected countries, the hard work by local communities as well as national and international 
support” (WHO, 2005a).  
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In fact, the increased occurrence of outbreaks of infectious diseases following natural 
disasters may be exaggerated.  More than twenty years ago, Seaman and colleagues 
questioned this widespread belief, noting that it probably evolved from the historical 
association of war, famine and social upheavals with epidemics of smallpox, typhus, plague 
and dysentery (Seaman, 1984).  Drawing on his experience at the US Centers for Diseases 
Control and Prevention as well as other research, Blake (1989) concluded in 1989 that during 
the previous 40 years, outbreaks of communicable diseases following natural disaster had 
been unusual.  In a recent update of Blakes’ work, a review of 38 natural disasters (including 
at least 10 floods) around the world between 1970 and 1992, only six were accompanied by 
outbreaks, and only two of those was a potentially waterborne agent (typhoid fever in 
Mauritius in 1980 following a cyclone, and diarrhoeal disease in the Sudan in 1988 following 
a flood) (Toole, 1997).  The inevitability of epidemics following natural disasters is a myth.      
 
These reviews notwithstanding, it is nevertheless important to continue efforts to minimise 
the risk of infectious diseases in the aftermath of a tsunami and to maintain good disease 
surveillance.  First, while perhaps not meeting Blakes’ definition of an outbreak, there is 
evidence of increased transmission of faecal-oral transmission of infectious diseases 
following a flood (WHO, 1998).  Published studies have reported post-flood increases in 
cholera, cryptosporidiosis, non-specific diarrhoea, poliomyelitis, rotavirus, typhoid and 
paratyphoid, and a variety of vector-borne diseases (Ahern, 2005).  Second, as noted above, 
there was evidence of increased levels of diarrhoeal disease in certain areas affected by the 
tsunami even though most reports concluded there was no outbreak.  This may, in fact, be 
attributable to less than optimal surveillance or perhaps to the willingness of local health 
officials to tolerate some increase in incidence of disease without characterizing it officially 
as an outbreak.  Finally, even if epidemics following floods have been largely averted in the 
past, it cannot be ruled out that this was the result of active steps in disease prevention such 
as the provision of safe drinking water.       
 
5.2 Water Quality Surveillance 
 
Water quality surveillance did not reach the same level of coverage.  As noted elsewhere, 
government agencies responsible for water supply focused primarily on providing sufficient 
quantities of water, and only secondarily on water quality.  NGOs reported that water quality 
surveillance was a problem before the tsunami.  Ministries of Health in certain countries 
were able to mobilize surveillance teams to monitor water quality in some cases.  Public 
Health Inspectors (PHIs) were sometimes used for this purpose, as were volunteers, including 
women’s and youth groups.  However, even when there were personnel to test water quality, 
they often depended on WHO or NGOs to provide them with even basic tools to assess 
residual chlorine levels; few had apparatus or know-how for testing physical parameters to 
ensure proper disinfection or microbiological and chemical contaminants that could present 
immediate or longer-term health hazards.   
 
As a result of the limited surveillance, there is little data on the safety of the water provided 
to and consumed by the affected population.  In Aceh, CARE coordinated a pilot survey of 
48 households four weeks after the tsunami (Albert, 2005). Of these, 77% were using 
shallow wells as their primary source of drinking water, the others using tanks (10%), 
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boreholes (8%) and streams (4%).  85% considered their water to be unsafe, and all reported 
boiling to make it safe for drinking, though not in every instance. Except for 2 of 3 tanks 
maintained by relief organizations, sources were all positive for E. coli , including shallow 
wells (median 450 CFU/100ml), boreholes (15 CFU/100ml) and streams (>2500 
CFU/100ml).  More troubling, however, was the finding that 67% of the 43 samples from 
water stored at the household were positive for E. coli, with 15% having counts >101 
CFU/100ml (the WHO “high risk” level) and 22% between 11 and 100 (“intermediate risk”).  
The findings raised questions about the adequacy of the boiling approach being promoted in 
the region as an alternative to household chlorination, especially since the only samples free 
of the faecal indicator at source or household were those found to contain residual chlorine.   
 
In February, CARE and the Provincial Health Office conducted a more extensive survey of 
400 households from 51 IDP settlements in Aceh (Handzel, 2005).  In these camps, most 
people relied on tankered water (61%), shallow wells (12.1%), boreholes (8.8%) or treatment 
units directly serving the camps (5.8%). Only 11.9% considered the quantity of water 
supplied to be inadequate. Water supplies under camp management were generally, though 
not universally, positive for residual chlorine (11 of 14 tanks, 3/5 piped supplies, 2/2 tanker 
trucks, 3/3 treatment plants).  While only 1 of 11 tankers were positive for E. coli, boreholes 
(7/10) and especially hand dug wells were highly contaminated (10/10, with geometric mean 
of 216.8 CFU/100ml).  The survey found that 97.7% of the householders reported collecting 
water from the camp-managed tanks and 99% reported using this water for drinking. 
Interestingly, of those who use the chlorinated water for drinking, 78% said they boil it first, 
perhaps due to lack of experience and/or trust of chlorinated water which was not the norm 
pre-tsunami.  Despite these generally encouraging findings, however, 47.5% of the 400 water 
samples taken from water stored in the home for drinking were positive for E. coli, with 
13.3% at the “high risk” level and 18.0% at “intermediate risk”.   In other areas, NGOs 
confirmed cases of significant under-dosing (no detectible residual chlorine) and over-dosing 
(up to 6 ppm) of chlorine.  While inadequate disinfection of supplied water presents an 
obvious health risk, over-dosing is also problematic since it encourages people to consume 
water from untreated sources and form strong opinions against chlorinated water which may 
be difficult to reverse. 
 
Under the co-ordination of UNICEF and with technical support from CDC, plans are under 
way in Aceh to involve more NGOs in an extension of the CARE surveys. This will involve 
water quality monitoring (at source and household level) and active diarrhoeal disease 
surveillance through household surveys in around fifty sentinel camps and temporary living 
centres (TLCs) around Banda Aceh and Aceh Basar; such a monitoring system is vital to 
gain a more accurate picture of living conditions and highlight areas for improvement in the 
response as it moves into the rehabilitation phase. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
1.  Continue to take steps to minimize the risks of waterborne diseases following natural 
disasters.  
 
Drinking water is cited as a health priority in most emergencies.  Texts used to guide 
emergency response identify water as an immediate need of an affected population (Davis & 
Lambert, 2002; Médecins Sans Frontières, 1997; Adams, 1999; House & Reed, 2000; Eade 
& Williams, 1995; Sphere Project, 2004).   As has been noted, however, the risk of outbreaks 
following natural disasters may be exaggerated.  Blake noted that following a disaster, there 
is enormous pressure on political leaders and public health officials to take control, and that 
disease control interventions such as water received immediate attention because they were 
relatively easy to organize, highly visible and photogenic, and gave health authorities and the 
public a sense of accomplishment. Unfounded risk assessment can result in unwarranted 
allocation of resources and failure to attend to more pressing priorities. 
 
At the same time, it is important not to become complacent from a lack of outbreaks of 
serious disease. As noted above, studies have shown increased transmission of faecal-oral 
diseases following floods and there was at least some evidence of increased incidence of 
diarrhoeal disease in the areas affected by the tsunami.  Moreover, the infrequency of 
epidemics following natural disasters could in fact be attributable to the response that such 
events tend to mobilize.  There are also circumstances that may have minimized the risk here.  
Those affected by the tsunami initially settled in relatively small camps and with host 
communities, reducing the overcrowding (and subsequent disease outbreaks) which have 
occurred in massive conflict-induced refugee camps. Saline water intrusion prevented the 
affected population in many areas from consuming water that may have been 
microbiologically unsafe.  As the response moves into the rehabilitation and resettlement 
phases, governments are working to relocate people from tents to semi-permanent structures 
(in Indonesia, baraks) and eventually to rebuild homes. These population movements, as well 
as the normal increase in diarrhoea that accompanies the monsoons, could cause increased 
morbidity and mortality (Orellana, 2005). 
 
2.  Develop and disseminate practical solutions for the special circumstances associated 
with tsunamis, including saline water intrusion. 
 
As has been previously discussed, the response to the tsunami raised unique challenges for 
those involved in the relief effort.  This included the forcefulness and breadth of the 
devastation, the extent of the loss of life and property, and the time that would be necessary 
to recover.  The vulnerability of these populations, their economic dependency on the sea, 
and the special characteristics of their dwellings, water supplies, sanitation facilities and 
hygiene practices, all created special circumstances that affect the drinking water response.  
Nevertheless, most disaster response guides do not address tsunamis at all, or treat them 
generally as floods (Duffy, 1990; French & Holt, 1989; Johns Hopkins/IFRC, undated). 
Many relief organizations acknowledged that they lacked experience and know-how in 
dealing with the hydrological and engineering issues associated with saline water infiltration.  
Some who had responded to floods in the area in the past admitted that some of their initial 
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preparations were misguided.  Rapid assessments did not always identify the special issues 
presented by the tsunami.  Innovative solutions were often necessary to deal with the special 
circumstances presented. 
 
A coordinated effort by international organizations, governments, donors and responders is 
necessary to document the emergency response to this tsunami and to distil the lessons 
learned.  This should include the development of practical and scalable approaches to deal 
with common problems wrought by tsunamis, including the restoration of groundwater and 
soil affected by saline water intrusion.   
 
3. Clarify the conditions under which proven approaches to household water treatment 
may be useful in emergencies, and assess their role in the medium- and long-term 
response. 
 
Although the household-based approaches to water treatment have proven to be effective in 
development programmes and certain refugee settings, their utility in emergencies has not yet 
been widely demonstrated. Quite to the contrary, the evidence from the first three months 
following the Indian Ocean tsunami suggests that household water treatment may be 
inappropriate during the immediate phases of a disaster of this kind.   Because of the scale of 
damage and numbers affected, other priorities such as ensuring access to a sufficient quantity 
of water, took precedent. Thus, despite large shipments of various household water treatment 
technologies, the evidence suggests that most have still not yet been distributed.   While 
some relief organizations initially tried introducing such products, most concluded that they 
would be of more use once the displaced population began to settle permanently, either in 
their original community locations or the governmental temporary living centres (designed to 
last between 1-2 years), i.e. when people actually have ‘households’.  
 
It is important to note that household water treatment, like all other hardware, also requires 
appropriate software (i.e. promotion and training support) to be fully effective. Experience 
has shown that victims of a disaster may not be open to any new intervention offered to them 
with a promise of health improvement; they will still have preferences as under normal 
circumstances and if drinking water treatment is to be sustained into the future then methods 
must appeal to these preferences. If there are insufficient field staff in the initial emergency 
stages to carry out such training, it is perhaps preferable to delay the introduction of new 
point-of-use methods until it can be done more thoroughly with plans for sustainability, 
rather than risk detrimental effects (such as a decrease in established boiling practices).   
 
When conditions and staffing are suitable for a household-based intervention, implementers 
should consider carefully the context and choose from among proven technologies.  Among 
the factors to be considered include the following: (i) the extent and precise composition of 
the microbiological threat (e.g., most filters are not effective against viruses, and some 
encysted protozoa are resistant to chemical disinfection); (ii) physical water parameters 
(temperature, pH, turbidity, etc., that may affect performance); (iii) anticipated period during 
which the population will be using the intervention; (iv) extent and nature of the 
programmatic support necessary to introduce and ensure adoption of the intervention; (v) 
portability and transferability of the intervention to permanent location; and (vi) mechanisms 
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for sustaining the intervention following the departure of the implementing organization 
(e.g., local availability of consumables, affordability, acceptability, etc.). 
 
Finally, as noted above, there is evidence to suggest that household-based water treatment 
and safe storage may play a more important role in the affected area over the medium- and 
long-term.  It is therefore recommended that this issue be revisited, perhaps 12-18 months 
following the tsunami, to better understand the actual significance of these interventions in 
the overall response.      
 
4.  Improve water quality and surveillance without compromising emphasis on water 
quantity. 
 
Although quantity should continue to take precedence over quality in disaster response, 
governments and relief organizations should seek ways maximizing microbial water quality 
even in the initial stages of a disaster response. Experience from the Indian Ocean tsunami 
repeatedly showed instances of inadequate or excess chlorination, both of which can lead to 
health hazards.  Drinking water surveillance plans have been developed for low-income 
settings (Bartram, 1990).  Simple procedures and tools for treating water and monitoring its 
microbial quality must be devised and consistently implemented for emergency settings. For 
example, tanker operators should be trained in the chlorination process, including correct 
dosing and the methods for testing residual levels. Samples should be taken from each tanker 
at regular intervals throughout the day to test residual chlorine levels and water quality 
(chemical and microbiological) surveillance systems established as early in the response as 
possible. As is under development in Aceh, this could be incorporated into the regular camp 
visits of co-operating agencies and organisations with a central system for sample processing 
and data collection. 
 
5.  Take advantage of the enormous resources committed to the tsunami response to 
make effective and sustainable improvements in water, sanitation and hygiene in the 
affected areas. 
 
The UN’s Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have reported that 
committed humanitarian assistance to the Flash Appeal for tsunami-affected countries 
currently stands at US$2.73 billion with a further US$1.45 billion pledged but not committed 
(OCHA, 2005); this is in addition to further funds raised by individual organisations or 
campaigns.  The World Bank has already committed loans of several billion dollars to help 
rebuild housing and infrastructure in countries affected by the disaster.  With such 
widespread public, NGO and donor support, there is an unprecedented opportunity to 
improve standards of living and public health in the affected areas, rather than a matter of 
simply returning them to their status quo ante.   Oxfam has dubbed the mission 
‘Reconstruction Plus’. 
  
Many organisations still working in the affected regions are indeed working to take 
advantage of this opportunity.  Governments in the affected nations are crafting master plans 
to establish and budget for priorities.  These should include health-driven initiatives that are 
evidence-based and cost-effective.  In the area of environmental health, these should include 
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ensuring appropriate water and sanitation provision for newly built schools, updating 
municipal water supply and sewerage systems during their repair and rehabilitation, 
protecting open water sources (e.g. wells, springs), raising awareness through health 
promotion campaigns. In certain cases, household water treatment should be a priority given 
its proven effectiveness and cost effectiveness.  The emergency should also be used as an 
opportunity to introduce integrated health and hygiene programs that can address not only 
water- and food-borne agents, but also other environmental hazards such as air quality and 
disease vectors.  In each case, the interventions should be implemented in consultation with 
the communities to ensure that they are appropriate, acceptable and sustainable. 
 
6.  Document experiences from the tsunami response, distil the lessons learned, 
disseminate the results, and develop guidelines to inform future actions.  
 
The forgoing summary may suggest an orderly response based on early, accurate and 
comprehensive assessments, supported by sufficient supplies of experienced personnel and 
appropriate equipment, and validated by timely and complete monitoring and evaluation of 
information that was widely disseminated to all stakeholders.  In fact, responders reported 
that in many areas, the first three months were a nightmare of disorganization, with 
conflicting opinions, poor cooperation, major territoriality, organizational self-promotion, 
and irrational use of resources.   There was frustration with the lack of early data collection 
or the failure to act on information that was collected.  There was often a lack of consensus 
about the specific technologies or methods that should be deployed at various stages of the 
response.  Accordingly, shipments of equipment and supplies were did not always 
correspond with the immediate priorities.  While national governments were mainly driving 
the response, at times there was a lack of central command and control.   
 
Although these shortcomings are common in large disaster responses, it may be possible to 
mitigate them to some extent by documenting experiences, distilling the lessons learned and 
disseminating the results.  As with the Sphere Project, this could lead to improved guidelines 
to inform future actions on emergency response.        
 
Finally, while this report focuses on issues relating to emergency response, it should be noted 
that mechanisms should be created to increase emergency preparedness. Addressing this 
aspect of the disaster management cycle would minimize substantively the costs of response 
and many lives would be saved.      
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ANNEX 1 
 
 
Action for Food Production (AFPRO) 
AmeriCares 
Apollo Hospitals 
Aquaya/Brown University 
Bless 
BushProof 
CARE 
Catholic Relief Services (CSR) 
CAWST 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Community and Water Environment Forum 
DHAN Foundation 
EAWAG 
Evangelical Church of India 
Helvetas Sri Lanka 
Hindustan Lever Ltd. 
Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
International Committee for the Red Cross 
International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
International Network to Promote Household Water Treatment and Safe Storage 
IRC 
Johns Hopkins University 
LEAD 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
Lutheran World Service 
Katadyn Products AG 
Medentech Ltd. 
Médicins Sans Frontières 
National Water Supply & Drainage Board (Sri Lanka) 
Oxfam GB 
Procter & Gamble Company 
Project Hope 
PSI 
Red Cross Sri Lanka 
RedR 
Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage Board (TWAD) 
Samaritans Purse 
Sri Lanka Ministry of Health 
UNICEF 
Yayasan Dian Desa 
WaterAid 
World Health Organization 
World Vision 
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